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Introduction
A clear inference from prior theoretical research is that firm insiders with private
information about firm performance would garner no strategic advantage by disclosing
either their information or their intention to act on their information in advance of actually
acting on it (Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996; Huddart, Hughes and Williams, 2004). This
research, however, characteristically ignores the reduction in litigation risk associated with
disclosures in advance of any insider wrongdoing. When disclosure has the potential to
reduce litigation risk, firms and/or firm insiders trade off litigation risk reduction against
the loss in strategic advantage that results from greater transparency, in choosing an
optimal disclosure policy. We refer to the voluntary disclosure of either information or the
intention to act on the information in advance of acting on it as “scienter disclosure.” In
other words, scienter disclosure describes disclosure that attempts to mitigate litigation
risks associated with any potential wrongdoing.
This study posits that the disclosure of insiders’ participation within Rule 10b5-1
trading plans is an example of scienter disclosure, and examines the determinants and
implications of firms’ decisions to disclose these plans. The Rule 10b5-1 setting offers a
natural opportunity to investigate the influence of litigation risk on insiders’ propensity to
disclose private information, because legal precedent indicates that Rule 10b5-1
participation disclosure provides clear, legal risk-reduction benefits.
Rule 10b5-1 enables insiders to diversify firm-specific holdings with reduced legal
risk if they plan trades while not in possession of material nonpublic information. Despite
an April 2002 proposal to mandate 8-K disclosure of insiders’ participation in the Rule, the
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SEC currently does not require public reporting of insiders’ trade plans. 1 Many firms,
however, opt to voluntarily disclose information regarding insiders’ participation within
Rule 10b5-1 trading plans. This disclosure choice is interesting because one would not
expect pre-trade voluntary disclosure when there is potential for strategic trade within
10b5-1 plans (Jagolinzer, 2008) and the disclosure may reveal privately held information.
It is possible, however, that pre-disclosure of trade may be strategic in the face of high
legal risk if it mitigates legal risk and does not fully reveal privately held information.
Our evidence indicates that voluntary Rule 10b5-1 disclosure is associated with the
level of firm legal risk and a proxy for insiders’ potential strategic trade. Our evidence also
indicates that Rule 10b5-1 disclosure is associated with greater abnormal returns to
insiders’ trades, especially for firms disclosing specific plan details. Finally, our evidence
indicates that investors do not respond negatively to Rule 10b5-1 participation disclosure.
Collectively, our work has three salient implications for voluntary disclosure: 1) litigation
risk can play a key role in the propensity to disclose information prior to strategic trade; 2)
Rule 10b5-1 participation disclosure does not fully reveal insiders’ private information; and
3) disclosure in this setting may actually enhance insiders’ strategic trade opportunities,
which is seemingly inconsistent with the SEC’s intent for the Rule.
These findings have important implications with regard to the link between
voluntary disclosure and litigation risk.

A large body of accounting research has

investigated managers’ incentives to voluntary disclose information when facing high
litigation risk (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994; Kasznik and
Lev, 1995; Skinner, 1997; Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2002; Field, Lowry, and
Shu, 2005; Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2008). The literature does not consider, however,
1

SEC Release No. 33-8090, Proposed Rule: Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions.
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managers’ incentives to voluntary disclose information prior to strategic trade. Our study
is significant, therefore, because it provides the first evidence that firms and/or firm
insiders trade off the benefit of litigation risk reduction against the loss of strategic trading
opportunities as a result of greater transparency when choosing an optimal disclosure
policy.
These findings also have important implications regarding Rule 10b5-1 governance.
Courts, for example, might more carefully consider whether 10b5-1 disclosure mitigates
scienter, because strategic trade appears to be associated with enhanced disclosure. The
SEC should also consider that a mandate to disclose 10b5-1 participation might not
mitigate strategic trade within the Rule. If evidence in this study is reflective of Rule 10b51 use, then firms that currently do not disclose participation (i.e., those most apt to be
affected by a disclosure mandate) are likely those that already have the lowest potential for
insiders’ strategic trade.
The study proceeds as follows.

Section 1 provides background information

regarding Rule 10b5-1 and outlines expectations regarding disclosure choice determinants
and implications. Section 2 outlines sample selection procedures. Section 3 outlines
empirical tests and results. Finally, section 4 summarizes results and discusses potential
governance implications.
1. Rule 10b5-1 background, disclosure choice, and disclosure implications
1.1. Rule 10b5-1 background
U.S. corporate insiders face legal risk (both civil and criminal) when trading their
firms’ securities because they frequently possess material nonpublic (or “inside”)
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information about pending future firm performance and it is generally unlawful to trade
without first disclosing this information. 2
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-1 in October, 2000, in part, to provide a vehicle
through which insiders could more readily diversify their firm-specific holdings.3 The
Rule provides an affirmative defense that reduces trade-related litigation risk for insiders
who enter into trade plans when they do not possess material nonpublic information. This
affirmative defense allows more trade flexibility because it absolves insiders from having
to cancel pre-planned trades or disclose subsequently obtained material nonpublic
information before pre-planned trades execute.
Rule 10b5-1’s guidance suggests that regulators expect uninformed diversification
trade from insiders’ trade plans. Specifically, the Rule applies if the insider can show that
“before becoming aware of the information” the insider: (1) “entered into a binding
contract to purchase or sell the security; instructed another person to purchase or sell the
security for the [insider’s] account, or adopted a written plan for trading securities”; (2) put
in the plan “. . . the amount of securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and
the date on which the securities were to be purchased or sold; . . . a written formula or
algorithm . . . for determining the amount of securities to be purchased or sold and the price
at which and the date on which the securities were to be purchased or sold; or [did] not
permit the [insider] to exercise any subsequent influence over [transactions]”; and (3) did
not “alter[] or deviate[] from the contract, instruction, or plan to purchase or sell securities
(whether by changing the amount, price, or timing of the purchase or sale), or enter[] into
2

See Bainbridge (2000) for a detailed discussion regarding insider trading law.
Linda Chatman Thomsen, SEC Director, Division of Enforcement stated recently that “the idea [of Rule
10b5-1] was to give executives opportunities to diversify or become more liquid through the use of plans with
prearranged trades without facing the prospect of an insider trading investigation.” (Speech by SEC Staff:
Opening Remarks Before the 15th Annual NASPP Conference, October 10, 2007).
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or altered a corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to those
securities.” 4
There is evidence, however, that Rule 10b5-1 may provide insiders with strategic
trade opportunities that generate abnormal trade returns. 5 Insiders may, for example, preplan trade based on longer-term nonpublic information because of perceived lower legal
risk. 6

Insiders may also strategically modify the content or timing of disclosure to

increase profitability of previously planned trades. 7 Finally, insiders may also terminate
Rule 10b5-1 plans when they possess material nonpublic information that indicates that a
hold strategy would be more profitable than allowing pre-planned sales to continue. 8
Jagolinzer (2008) shows that insiders’ 10b5-1 sales are, on average, associated with
declines in future firm performance, suggesting there is some strategic behavior within
Rule 10b5-1.
1.2. Disclosure choice
In April, 2002, The SEC proposed mandatory disclosure, through 8-K filings, of
insiders’ use of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans. 9 Specifically, the proposal suggested disclosure
of the name and title of the director or executive officer, the date on which the director or
4

17 CFR § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(C).
This contrasts the affect of other insider trade regulation and case law that has been shown to mitigate the
degree to which insiders’ time strategic trade [Seyhun (1992) and Garfinkel (1997)].
6
Insiders may perceive lower legal risk when initiating plans while in possession of long term nonpublic
information because the possession standard is applied at the plan initiation date. It is likely more difficult
for plaintiffs to demonstrate possession as the distance grows between the plan initiation date and the
information revelation date.
7
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) provide evidence that disclosures are strategically timed to minimize new
option grant strike prices.
8
Abstaining from trade while in possession of material nonpublic information is not deemed unlawful [see
Fried (2003) for a policy discussion]. Therefore, terminating a plan while in possession of material nonpublic
information is not deemed unlawful [SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Manual of Publicly Available
Telephone Interpretations, Fourth Supplement, Rule 10b5-1, Question 15 (issued May 2001)]. The argument
is based on a limit in the statute that fraud be “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,” and
since there is neither when a plan is terminated, there is no securities fraud. The SEC did suggest, however,
that early plan termination might raise questions about the good faith of the plan.
9
SEC Release No. 33-8090, Proposed Rule: Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions.
5
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executive officer entered into the 10b5-1 plan, and a description of the contract, including
duration, the aggregate number of securities to be purchased or sold, and the name of the
counterparty or agent. The proposal also suggested disclosure if the director or executive
officer later terminated or modified a plan.10 The proposal was tabled indefinitely, so there
is currently no requirement for firms or insiders to provide detail regarding whether or how
they participate within their trading plans.

Many firms, however, choose to disclose

information regarding insiders’ trade plans and there is substantive variation in disclosure
detail regarding insiders’ trade plan structures. These disclosure choices are inherently
interesting because they potentially offer insight into firms’ and insiders’ utilization of the
Rule.
Firms likely disclose Rule 10b5-1 details to reduce legal risk. The affirmative
defense provides some risk reduction without disclosure; however, disclosure can further
enhance legal protection by increasing the likelihood of early dismissal for securities class
action suits. Private class action suits represent a major component of firms’ overall legal
risk. If sued, firms face potentially large defense and settlement costs. 11 Since class action
lawsuits can be “won” or “lost” at the motion to dismiss phase of litigation, firms have
incentives to utilize methods, such as 10b5-1 disclosure, that enhance the likelihood of
dismissal.

10

Specifically, firms would disclose the date of the termination or modification and a description of the
modification, including duration, the aggregate number of securities to be purchased or sold, the interval at
which securities are to be purchased or sold, the number of securities to be purchased or sold in each interval,
the price at which securities are to be purchased or sold, and the identity of the counterparty or agent.
11
“[C]ompanies are paying the legal costs of…executives defending themselves against fraud allegations.
The amount of money being paid…totals hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars. A company’s
average cost of defending against shareholder suits last year was $2.2 million according to TillinghastTowers Perrin.” Laurie P. Cohen, “Adding Insult to Injury: Firms Pay Wrongdoers’ Legal Fees”, The Wall
Street Journal, February 17, 2004. Average firm settlements are approximately $30 million per suit. More
than ten suits settled between $300 million and $6 billion in 2005 alone (PWC 2005; Buckberg 2005).
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To dismiss suits involving insider trading allegations, firms may present evidence
of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans as an affirmative defense. At the motion to dismiss phase,
however, only previously disclosed plans are admissible because courts do not consider
materials other than the plaintiff’s pleadings when considering the motion, and defendants
are not typically allowed to rebut factual allegations. 12 Courts may, however, consider
publicly available documents that are not a part of the complaint, for example, taking
judicial notice of SEC filings, prospectuses, analysts’ reports, and other publicly reported
data. 13 Therefore, a publicly disclosed 10b5-1 plan has a greater likelihood of influencing
a motion to dismiss than a plan that is not publicly disclosed. 14 This view is shared by
corporate advisors. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services, the largest proxy
advising firm for institutional shareholders, concludes, “such plans should be filed in some
form with the SEC so that [they] . . . can be considered at the motion to dismiss stage.” 15
Lawyers advising firms on securities fraud litigation matters also think disclosure is a
prerequisite to risk reduction: “[t]he adoption of the Rule 10b5-1 trading plans . . . should

12

See, e.g., Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88-89 (6th Cir.1997).
See, e.g., In re Royal Appliance Sec. Litig., 1995 WL 490131, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug.15, 1995).
14
Precedent cases suggest that disclosure is needed to mount a defense at the motion to dismiss stage. For
example, Fener v. Belo Corp.425 F.Supp.2d 788 (N.D. Tex. 2006) notes that plaintiffs have an obligation to
address in their complaint whether a trading plan was in effect, and if so, “why . . . this does not undercut a
strong inference of scienter.” Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 291 F. Supp. 2d 845 (WD. Wis. 2003) notes that it
would generally not consider the trading plan or any other document appended to the motion to dismiss, but it
would in this case since the plan was “publicly available on the SEC's website and was filed as an exhibit to
numerous reports Rayovac filed with the SEC.” In re Netflix, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 1562858 (N.D. Cal.
June 28, 2005) and Weitschner v. Monterey Pasta Company, 2003 WL 22889372, No. C 03-0632 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 4, 2003) the courts consider publicly disclosed trading plans at the motion to dismiss stage to find no
strong inference of scienter. S.E.C. v. Healthsouth Corp., 261 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1322-3 (N.D.Ala., 2003)
notes the existence and disclosure of a trading plan to rebut the SEC’s allegations of the requisite scienter for
securities fraud.
15
See White, T., “More on Trading Plans/Restrictions and Motions to Dismiss: Monterey Pasta Co. and
Rayovac Corp.” November 24, 2003, RiskMetrics Group, available at
http://slw.riskmetrics.com/2003/11/more_on_trading_plansrestricti.html (last visited April 7, 2008).
13
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be publicly disclosed” to reduce the risk of litigation (Roberts and Porritt, 2004; Siegel and
Lenahan, 2002). 16
Since courts consider publicly available data at the motion to dismiss phase, the
degree of disclosed detail regarding insiders’ Rule 10b5-1 plans likely impacts the
probability of dismissal. If only the existence of a plan is disclosed, a court may not have
sufficient detail to ascertain whether the insider sufficiently complied with the Rule and
whether the allegedly fraudulent trades are covered by an existing plan. If the full plan
details are disclosed, a court may better ascertain whether the allegedly fraudulent trades
fall within the Rule’s affirmative defense, thereby increasing the probability of a low-cost
dismissal.
The preceding discussion suggests that firms and insiders likely obtain litigation
benefits from Rule 10b5-1 plan disclosures, and that the benefits are increasing in the
specificity of the public disclosures. If so, then one would expect firms with greater ex
ante litigation risk to be more apt to disclose the existence and details of Rule 10b5-1 plans.
Insiders bear costs to 10b5-1 disclosures, however, if investors infer a price relevant
signal from disclosure or if disclosure enhances investors’ monitoring of insiders’ trade
plan commitment. If investors infer a price relevant signal from disclosure then disclosure
may induce investor front-running, which can reduce insiders’ pending trade profitability
(Huddart, Hughes, and Williams, 2004). 17 If disclosure provides investors with insiders’
10b5-1 plan details, then it allows for ex post reconciliation of plan commitment.
Reconciliation would entail matching data reported in insiders’ transaction reports (e.g.,

16

“While public disclosure of a trading plan is not required, such disclosure often helps to minimize the
market impact and negative implications of insider sales.” (Siegel & Lenahan, 2002).
17
Counselors and financial advisors suggested in interviews that front-running concerns factored into the
decision to not disclose or to disclose little detail regarding 10b5-1 participation.
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SEC Form 4), with details provided with 10b5-1 disclosures. Reconciliation could reveal
insiders’ use of the strategic early plan termination option, potentially increasing regulatory
scrutiny of insiders’ good faith compliance with the Rule. 18 Therefore, specific disclosure
reduces insiders’ value of the early termination option. Ceteris paribus, then, insiders
should generally not prefer disclosure; therefore disclosure probability should be lower
when insiders have more firm control.
Insiders infer 10b5-1 disclosure benefits, however, if they perceive that disclosure
provides incremental litigation protection for strategic trade. If this is the case, then
insiders’ preference for disclosure should be increasing with their strategic trade potential.
In models of insiders’ strategic trade (e.g., Kyle 1985; Huddart and Ke 2007), insiders’
information advantage is determined by: (1) prior stock price variance and (2) the precision
of insiders’ private information. Specifically, low investor uncertainty—i.e., low prior
stock price variance—provides little scope for profitable insider trade, even if the insider
possesses perfect private information. For a given level of private information, then,
insiders’ strategic trade potential is increasing in prior stock price variance. If insiders
infer that disclosure provides litigation protection benefits regarding potential strategic
trade then disclosure probability should be greater when insiders have more firm control
and there is higher investor uncertainty. 19
Outside shareholders might infer 10b5-1 disclosure benefits if disclosure provides
for better monitoring of or greater insider commitment to disclosed trade plans. Outside
18

The SEC states that “[t]ermination of a plan, or the cancellation of one or more plan transactions, could
affect the availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for prior plan transactions [SEC Division of Corporation
Finance, Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, Fourth Supplement, Rule 10b5-1, Question
15(b) (issued May 2001)].”
19
Disclosure probability should also be greater when insiders have more precise private information. We
cannot empirically test this prediction since insiders’ private information about pending performance is
unobservable.

9

shareholders might also infer disclosure benefits if disclosure provides a signal regarding
insiders’ private information, and provides firm-level litigation protection if insiders trade
strategically. These benefits likely increase when insiders have greater strategic trade
potential, since governance is likely more relevant, insiders’ signals are likely more
informative, and firm-level litigation risk is likely greater.

If this is the case, then

disclosure probability should be greater with high outside investor firm control and should
be even greater when investors concurrently have more uncertainty—i.e., when prior stock
price variance is high.
1.3. Disclosure implications
1.3.1. Realized trade and firm performance
If the probability of Rule 10b5-1 disclosure is increasing in insiders’ strategic trade
potential, then disclosure should be associated with greater observed strategic trade.
Strategic trade can be inferred ex post from an association between insiders’ sales
transactions and subsequent declines in fundamental economic and returns performance.
Further, if strategic trade litigation protection is increasing in disclosure specificity, then
the degree of observed strategic trade should also increase with disclosure specificity.
Consider, for example, three disclosure groups: non-disclosure, limited disclosure,
and specific disclosure. The non-disclosure group likely represents firms that infer low
litigation, monitoring, plan commitment, or information signal benefits from disclosure
because insiders have low strategic trade potential. If this is the case, then this group is
likely not associated with strategic trade. The limited disclosure group likely represents
firms that infer some litigation, monitoring, plan commitment, or information signal
benefits from disclosure because insiders have some strategic trade potential. This group
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would likely contain, for example, insiders who possess less precise private information
and therefore place greater value in the strategic early termination option.

Limited

disclosure affords some legal protection, yet still retains the early termination option since
ex post reconciliation is not feasible. 20

If this is the case, then this group is likely

associated with modest strategic trade. The specific disclosure group likely represents
firms that infer substantive litigation, monitoring, plan commitment, or information signal
benefits from disclosure because insiders have high strategic trade potential. This group
would likely contain, for example, insiders who possess more precise private information
and are therefore less concerned with foregoing the strategic early termination option. If
this is the case, then this group is likely associated with the greatest degree of strategic
trade.
1.3.2. Investors’ disclosure response
If disclosure is associated with insiders’ strategic trade potential, then disclosure
may provide a price relevant signal to investors. Investors may respond negatively to
limited disclosures regarding 10b5-1 participation, for example, if they infer that insiders
have some strategic trade potential for which they seek litigation protection. Investors may
choose to delay their response to limited disclosure, however, if they recognize that the
participation disclosure implies that insiders’ private information has low precision.
Investors may choose, instead, to respond when insiders update their private information
signal with a subsequent sale (Lie, 2005). Similarly, investors should respond negatively to
specific disclosures regarding 10b5-1 participation, if they infer that insiders have high
strategic trade potential for which they seek high litigation protection.
20

Since limited disclosure does not provide sufficient plan detail, one cannot infer, ex post, whether an
absence of trade results from early termination, non-execution due to failure to meet limit orders, or natural
plan termination.
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2. Sample
The sample of participation disclosures are collected from keyword searches for
variants of the expression “10b5-1” through 8-K filings, business wire reports, and press
releases between October 2000 and December 2006. 21 This keyword search nets 773 firm
observations. Additional disclosure observations are collected from keyword searches for
variants of the expression “10b5-1” through SEC Form 4 filings between October 2000 and
December 2006. 22

This keyword search nets an additional 894 firm observations.

Estimation samples are further constrained by the availability of price and returns data
from CRSP, insider transaction data from Thomson Financial, institutional ownership data
from CDA/Spectrum, governance data from Equilar, and earnings performance data from
Compustat.
Sample disclosures of 10b5-1 plan participation are categorized by each author into
limited or specific partitions. If the disclosure delineates the specific terms underlying the
plan, the disclosure is classified as specific. Figure 1, Panel A provides one example of a
disclosure that is classified as specific. If the disclosure does not delineate the specific
terms underlying the plan, the disclosure is categorized as limited. Figure 1, Panel B
provides two examples of disclosures that are classified as limited. All Form 4 disclosures
are classified as limited since they generally state that a particular transaction is Rule 10b5-

21

Commonly reported variants of the keyword expression include “10-b-5-1” and “10b5-1(c)”.
The SEC mandated electronic Form 4 filings as of June 30, 2003. Unlike previously reported paper filings
(which are available electronically as image scans), the electronic filings enable global keyword searches. As
a result, a substantive proportion of the Form 4-generated sample comes from the period subsequent to June
2003.
22
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1 compliant, yet provide no specific details regarding the underlying plan. 23

This

classification procedure yields 94 specific and 1,573 limited firm observations that are
further constrained for estimation by data availability.
Some analyses require identifying a sample of firms where insiders’ participation in
Rule 10b5-1 is not disclosed. 24 The non-disclosure sample is inferred from firms where
there is no Rule 10b5-1 participation disclosure and where insiders execute sales
transactions

within

thirty-calendar-day

periods

that

precede

quarterly

earnings

announcements. This inference relies on the assumption that most firms generally blackout
insiders’ trades before earnings announcements, yet allow Rule 10b5-1 transactions to
bypass blackout restrictions. 25, 26
Firms across disclosure specificity groups appear generally similar in size and
performance, and are modestly larger and more profitable than the general Compustat
population during the estimation period. For example, median market value of equity
(untabulated) is $625, $745, $603, and $163 million and return on assets is 3%, 4%, 1.3%,
23

Form 4 disclosures may provide different inferences than other participation disclosures since they follow
trades made within 10b5-1 plans. Form 4 disclosures are similar to other limited disclosures, however, in that
they convey that an insider has initiated a plan and that the insider is likely to execute further trade within the
plan.
24
Jagolinzer (2008) corroborates the existence of firms that choose to not disclose 10b5-1 plan participation,
through a survey of nearly 2,700 Nasdaq firms. Nearly 18% of the 378 respondent firms report that they had
at least one insider participate within Rule 10b5-1 between October 2000 and December 2002, yet the firm
chose to not disclose this information.
25
Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor (2008) report that, from their sample of firm-specific insider trading
policies, the average blackout window preceding earnings announcements is 45.81 days. Bettis, Coles, and
Lemmon (2000) show that fewer than 15% of sample firms authorize insiders’ trades in the 30 days that
precede earnings announcements.
26
At least two errors can occur from this inference algorithm. The first is that the non-disclosure sample does
not include firms where insiders participate but their transactions are not realized within short proximity to
earnings announcements. The second is that the sample includes firms where insiders do not participate but
their transactions are authorized within short proximity to earnings either because the firm does not constrain
trade during these windows or because the firm authorizes alternative blackout waivers (e.g., Jagolinzer,
Larcker, and Taylor (2008) report that some firms authorize the general counsel to grant blackout window
waivers). Approximately 19% of the inferred non-disclosure sample shows evidence of insiders’ sales
transactions within thirty-day windows preceding earnings during the year 2000, before Rule 10b5-1
promulgation. This is consistent with alternative blackout waivers. Results are not sensitive to excluding
these observations.
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and 1.4% for the no-disclosure, limited-disclosure, specific-disclosure, and Compustat
population samples, respectively.
3. Empirical Analyses
We are interested in better understanding the determinants and implications of
voluntary disclosure of 10b5-1 plan participation. Our empirical tests, therefore, analyze
firms’ decisions to voluntary disclose participation in 10b5-1 plans, the association
between voluntary disclosure and subsequent firm returns and earnings performance, and
investors’ response to disclosure.
3.1. Disclosure choice
Our first empirical analysis investigates whether the voluntary disclosure of 10b5-1
plan participation is more prevalent for firms with high litigation risk and with high
potential for insiders’ strategic trade.

We investigate firms’ decisions to disclose

participation within Rule 10b5-1 trading plans using the following logistic regression
model:

(

)

Pr Discl = 1 = α 0 + α 1LitR isk + α 2InstitOwn + α 3InsideDirs + α 4V olat
+ α 5 ⎡⎣V olat *InstitOwn ⎤⎦ + α 6 ⎡⎣V olat *InsideDirs ⎤⎦ + ε

(1)

where Discl is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm discloses Rule 10b5-1
participation details, and zero otherwise; LitRisk is the firm’s expected class action
litigation probability estimated in the year prior to 10b5-1 participation disclosure; 27

27

Specifically, LitRisk is estimated from the following annual cross-sectional logistic regression (similar to
Rogers and Stocken, 2005): Pr (DMGPd = 1) = α0 + α1 MinReturn + α2 StdDevReturn + α3 Turnover + α4
MVE + α5 BHReturn + α6 Beta + α7 BiotechInd + α8 CompHWInd + α9 CompSWInd + α10 ElecInd + α11
RetailInd + ε, where DMGPd equals one if the fiscal year falls within an alleged class action damage period
(data provided by Woodruff Sawyer and Co.) and equals zero otherwise; MinReturn is the minimum single
day firm return during the fiscal year; StdDevReturn is the standard deviation of daily returns during the fiscal
year; Turnover is the average daily trade volume scaled by shares outstanding during the fiscal year; MVE is
the average market value of equity during the fiscal year; BHReturn is the prior fiscal year’s buy and hold
return; Beta is the firm’s beta coefficient from a regression of daily firm returns on daily market returns; and
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InstitOwn is the percentage of institutional firm ownership (CDA/Spectrum) in the year
prior to disclosure; InsideDirs is the ratio of officer directors to total board directors in the
year prior to disclosure (Equilar); and Volat is the standard deviation of residuals from a
regression of firm daily returns on the daily returns to the value-weighted CRSP portfolio
in the year prior to disclosure (CRSP).
If firms expect the net benefit from disclosure to be increasing in the expected
litigation risk then the coefficient for LitRisk should be positive. If outside investors expect
monitoring, plan commitment, litigation, or information signaling benefits from disclosure
then the coefficient for InstitOwn should be positive. If insiders expect front-running or
plan commitment costs from disclosure then the coefficient for InsideDirs should be
negative. If firms, insiders, and outside investors expect higher litigation risk benefits from
disclosure when insiders’ strategic trade potential is greater then the coefficients for Volat,
[Volat * InstitOwn], and [Volat *InsideDirs] should be positive.
Equation (1) is estimated using disclosure observations, both specific and limited,
where the fiscal year is the first year in which disclosure is observed between 2001 and
2006, and non-disclosure observations where the fiscal year is the first year in which
inferred Rule 10b5-1 participation is observed between 2001 and 2006. We estimate
equation (1) using two specifications. The first is a logistic regression that includes all
firm-year observations, which compares the disclosure firms against all non-disclosure
firms in the initial plan adoption year. In this specification, we include industry and year
BiotechInd, CompHWInd, CompSWInd, ElecInd, and RetailInd are dichotomous variables that equal one if
the firm represents the biotechnology, computer hardware, computer software, electric, or retail industries,
and equal zero otherwise. For descriptive purposes, pooled estimated coefficients and z-statistics are
MinReturn (coeff = −4.24, z = −10.78), StdDevReturn (coeff = −16.56, z = −5.97), Turnover (coeff = 6.42, z =
6.67), MVE (coeff = −0.01, z = −1.02), BHReturn (coeff = 0.00, z = 1.15), Beta (coeff = 0.67, z = 14.36),
BiotechInd (coeff = 0.80, z = 5.44), CompHWInd (coeff = 0.75, z = 3.39), CompSWInd (coeff = 0.61, z =
4.37), ElecInd (coeff = 0.22, z = 1.29), and RetailInd (coeff = 0.57, z = 3.03). Coefficient estimates differ
from those reported by Rogers and Stocken (2005) due to some differences in variable measurement.
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fixed effects to control for prevailing industry and market conditions. The second is a
conditional logistic that includes each disclosure observation and a matched non-disclosure
observation from the same fiscal year, 2-digit industry code, and with the closest market
value of equity. This specification potentially reduces the power of the tests, however, it
better controls for industry and size related factors that might be associated with disclosure
choice.
The first two panels of Table 1 report descriptive statistics for the determinants of
voluntary disclosure of 10b5-1 participation. Panel B, which reports univariate statistics
within disclosure groups, provides evidence that voluntary disclosure of plan participation
is more common for high litigation risk firms. Specifically, average LitRisk is relatively
greater for both the specific and limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms (difference
= 0.009 and 0.007, t-statistics = 4.37 and 12.00, respectively).

Panel B also provides

evidence that voluntary disclosure of plan participation is more common for high stock
price volatility firms. Specifically, average Volat is relatively greater for both the specific
and limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms (difference = 0.011 and 0.002, tstatistics = 4.98 and 4.09, respectively). In addition, average Volat is relatively greater for
the specific firms than the limited firms (difference = 0.009, t-statistic = 3.86).
The logistic and conditional logistic estimation results are presented in Panel C of
Table 1. 28 Consistent with evidence reported in Panel B, the results indicate that higher
litigation risk firms are associated with greater disclosure probability of 10b5-1 plan
participation (LitRisk coeffs. = 10.009 and 10.471; z-statistics = 3.31 and 2.88). The results
also indicate that firms with higher insider strategic trade potential are more likely to
28

Volat, InstitOwn and InsideDirs are recentered to their average values (i.e., the average of each variable has
been subtracted from each variable) to provide interpretation of the main effects at their average value.
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disclose 10b5-1 participation (Volat coeffs. = 22.189 and 25.143; z-statistics = 5.17 and
4.45). This suggests that firms with higher litigation risk expect benefits from disclosure.
The results also indicate that firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to
disclose 10b5-1 plan participation (InstitOwn coeffs. = 1.228 and 0.969; z-statistics = 5.63
and 3.94) and that this association is stronger when there is higher insider strategic trade
potential (Volat * InstitOwn coeffs. = 47.975 and 33.789; z-statistics = 4.33 and 2.42). This
suggests that institutional investors infer disclosure-related monitoring, plan commitment,
information signaling, or legal protection benefits. Results also indicate that officers prefer
disclosure only when there is higher insider strategic trade potential (Volat * InsideDirs
coeffs. = 31.625 and 29.043; z-statistics = 2.13 and 1.69). This suggests that insiders prefer
greater disclosure to mitigate litigation risk regarding potential strategic trade.
3.2. Realized trade and subsequent performance
3.2.1. Returns performance
The next analyses investigate whether Rule 10b5-1 plan participation disclosure is
associated with realized strategic trade by insiders. Figure 2 plots the cumulative abnormal
return relative to the timing of insiders’ sales that are executed after the first disclosure of
insiders’ participation within the Rule. Returns analyses focus exclusively on insiders’
sales transactions since sales comprise nearly all transactions executed within Rule 10b5-1
(Jagolinzer, 2008) and because there are no specific disclosure observations associated with
pending insider purchases. Specifically, Figure 2 cumulates the market adjusted firm
returns (daily firm return – the daily return to the value-weighted CRSP portfolio) from day
– 30 to day + 30 relative to each sales transaction (executed on day 0) during the one-year
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period that follows the insider’s first participation disclosure. 29 For non-disclosure firms, a
first-pseudo-disclosure date is identified as the sixtieth calendar day that precedes the first
observed within-blackout-window transaction. 30
Figure 2, Panel A shows that sales trades that follow specific disclosure are
associated with positive market-adjusted returns preceding the transaction and negative
market-adjusted returns subsequent to the transaction. Relatedly, Figure 2, Panel B shows
that sales trades that follow limited disclosure are also associated with positive marketadjusted returns preceding the transaction and negative market-adjusted returns subsequent
to the transaction. Finally, Figure 2, Panel C shows that sales trades that follow nondisclosure are associated with positive market-adjusted returns preceding the transaction.
However, these transactions do not appear to be associated with negative subsequent
market-adjusted returns. A comparison of post-trade returns slopes across Figure 2 panels
suggests that the degree to which sales transactions are associated with negative
performance is increasing in Rule 10b5-1 disclosure specificity.
To more formally test the association between trade returns and disclosure
specificity, Table 2, Panel B presents univariate comparisons of abnormal trade returns
across disclosure partitions. Specifically, Table 2 reports insider-specific dollar-weighted
average buy-and-hold abnormal trade returns for each insider’s sales transactions that

29

For all non-disclosure and most limited disclosure observations, it is not possible to discern the length of
10b5-1 plans. A typical disclosed plan length is 12 months, so we assume that trades made within 12 months
following plan disclosure are pursuant to the Rule. Misclassification of observed trades likely induces noise
to inferences regarding the association between trades and performance.
30
For disclosure firms (excluding Form 4 disclosures), the average number of days between disclosure and
the first observed trade is 53. The median number of days is 17. Results are not sensitive to denoting the
first-pseudo-disclosure date as the thirtieth calendar day that precedes the first observed within-blackoutwindow transaction.
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execute during the year that follows disclosure. 31 Consistent with evidence reported in
Figure 2, Table 2 Panel B indicates that post-trade abnormal returns become more negative
as disclosure of participation becomes more specific. For example, Panel B shows that the
average six-month post-trade abnormal return is −12.3%, −5.6%, and −0.3% (t-statistics =
−2.91, −13.56, and −1.00) for specific, limited, and non-disclosed trades, respectively.
To control for other factors that might explain differences in post-trade returns,
Table 3 provides evidence from a calendar-month portfolio estimation of monthly returns
regressed on factors known to explain monthly returns (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart,
1997). Our approach follows the portfolio estimation method suggested by Mitchell and
Stafford (2000), to control for potential contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation.
Specifically, within each disclosure category, monthly portfolios are formed between
January 2001 and July 2007 if a 10b5-1 sales transaction is observed in the preceding
calendar month. For each calendar month in which at least three firms are available to
form a portfolio, the following regression is estimated:

(R

port

)

(

)

− R f = β 0 + β1 R m − R f + β 2SMB + β3HML + β 4UMD + u

(2)

where Rport is the equally-weighted monthly portfolio return, Rf is the one-month treasury
bill rate, Rm is the value-weighted monthly market return, and SMB, HML, and UMD are
the monthly small-minus-big, high-minus-low, and momentum factors that explain
monthly stock returns (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997).

31

Weighted average abnormal returns are computed as

∑

J
j =1

DollarVol

( BHRw − VWBHRw ) j ,

j

∑ j =1 DollarVol
J

where

j

DollarVol is the trade dollar volume, BHRw is the trade’s w-month buy and hold return, VWBHRw is the wmonth buy and hold return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio, and j is a subscript for each trade executed.
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Consistent with evidence presented in Figure 2 and Table 2, results from Table 3
indicate that more specific 10b5-1 plan disclosures are associated with more negative posttrade abnormal returns. Specifically, abnormal returns to the non-disclosure portfolio
(0.001, t-statistic = 0.46) from column 1 of Table 3 are not statistically negative. Abnormal
returns to the limited-disclosure portfolio (−0.010, t-statistic = −2.25) from column 2 of
Table 3, however, are statistically negative. Abnormal returns to the specific-disclosure
portfolio (−0.047, t-statistic = −2.94) from column 3 are also statistically negative. Finally,
column 4 of Table 3 indicates that post-trade abnormal returns are statistically more
negative as disclosure becomes more specific. Formal tests comparing portfolio returns
indicate that post-trade abnormal returns are statistically more negative for the limiteddisclosure portfolio relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (−0.010, t-statistic = −1.86), for
the specific-disclosure portfolio relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (−0.041, t-statistic =
−4.08), and for the specific-disclosure portfolio relative to the limited-disclosure portfolio
(−0.031, t-statistic = −3.04).
We also present results using a firm-level calendar-time regression for robustness.
The Mitchell and Stafford (2000) portfolio method can result in relatively low power tests
due to observation aggregation at the month portfolio level (see Loughran and Ritter
(2000), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2007) for a
discussion). Following Cheng, Nagar and Rajan (2007), the following regression model is
estimated:

(R

j

)

− R m = δ 0 + δ1None + δ 2Limited + δ 3Specific + δ 4Ln (BT M )
+ δ 5 PriorReturn + δ 6 PriorVolatility + z
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(3)

where Rj is the monthly firm return, Rm is the equal-weighted or value-weighted monthly
CRSP portfolio market return, None is a dichotomous variable that equals one during the
month following a non-disclosed inferred Rule 10b5-1 sales transaction and equals zero
otherwise, Limited is a dichotomous variable that equals one during the month following a
limited-disclosed Rule 10b5-1 sales transaction and equals zero otherwise, Specific is a
dichotomous variable that equals one during the month following a specific-disclosed Rule
10b5-1 sales transaction and equals zero otherwise, BTM is the book-to-market ratio
measured at the end of the previous month, PriorReturn is the buy-and-hold firm return
over the preceding 12 months, and PriorVolatility is the standard deviation of monthly
stock returns over the preceding 36 months.

We control for common events within

industries using 2-digit industry code fixed effects.

We also control for potential

dependency in firm returns within months through the use of month-clustered standard
errors (Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2008). 32
Consistent with earlier results, Table 4 provides evidence that the association
between sales transactions and subsequent negative performance is increasing in disclosure
specificity, after controlling for other factors that are associated with firm returns.
Specifically, when the dependent variable equals the equal-weighted-market adjusted firm
monthly return, results indicate that abnormal returns following trade months are 1.2%,
1.6% and 4.3% lower than returns in other months for non-, limited-, and specificdisclosure firms, respectively. When the dependent variable equals the value-weightedmarket adjusted firm monthly return, results indicate that abnormal returns following trade

32

Lakonishok and Lee (2001) provide evidence that abnormal returns accrue to insiders’ sales at firms with
high book to market ratios and low market value of equity. This estimation explicitly controls for differences
in book to market ratios across firms. Market value of equity is implicitly controlled for because firms in the
different disclosure partitions are of similar size (untabulated).
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months are 1.1%, 2.1% and 4.3% lower than returns in other months for non-, limited-, and
specific-disclosure firms, respectively.

Formal tests indicate that post-trade abnormal

returns are generally statistically more negative as disclosure specificity increases.
3.2.2. Earnings and price relevant news
To better understand what may economically underlie the association between
disclosed Rule 10b5-1 trades and subsequent return performance, Table 5 presents results
regarding investors’ response to releases of earnings news, both before and after the first
observed trades that follow voluntary Rule 10b5-1 disclosures.

Specifically, Table 5

reports three-day market adjusted returns, centered on the quarterly announcement date
(RDQE from Compustat), for the four quarters that precede and that follow the quarter in
which the first insider trade is observed following disclosure. Returns are adjusted by
subtracting the same period return to the value-weighted CRSP portfolio.
Table 5 provides evidence of positive earnings announcement surprises for the four
quarters prior to insiders’ first sales for firms providing limited and specific disclosure
(pooled t-statistics = 5.57 and 2.24, respectively). This evidence is consistent with positive
earnings performance relative to investors’ expectations prior to insiders’ sales. Table 5
also provides some evidence of negative earnings announcement surprises for the four
quarters following insiders’ first sales for firms providing limited disclosure (pooled tstatistic = −2.23). This evidence is consistent with overall negative earnings performance
shifts from the period before to after insiders’ sales. Evidence for firms providing specific
disclosure indicates a similar decline in earnings performance across the periods, however,
there is no evidence of negative post-sales earnings performance perhaps because of low
power or because specific disclosure trades are associated with price relevant events that
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may not be impounded in short-term earnings. To explore this further, we analyze whether
specific disclosures are associated with subsequent news events that may not be impounded
in short-term earnings. We find that approximately 25% of the specific disclosure sample
exhibits a single news event, not related to earnings, for which the three-day market
adjusted return falls between −10% and −75%, within an average 140 calendar days of
disclosure. 33 We also find that approximately 33% of the remaining specific disclosure
sample exhibit sustained returns declines (between –20% and −80%), for which there is no
obvious associated information event, during the 180 calendar days that follow disclosure,.
Collectively, this evidence suggests that Rule 10b5-1 trades tend to be associated
with fundamental firm economic shifts. This mitigates the likelihood that observed returns
patterns result from investors’ response to 10b5-1 trade signals.
3.2.3. Investors’ response to 10b5-1 disclosure
We assess whether investors respond to 10b5-1 disclosure by estimating three day
market-adjusted returns centered on the initial participation disclosure date and on the
subsequent report date for the first trade execution.

We market-adjust returns by

subtracting the same period return to the value-weighted CRSP portfolio. Table 6 provides
evidence regarding returns to initial participation disclosures (Announcement) and to first
transaction disclosures (Transaction), which represent the transactions’ Form 4 SEC
reporting date (Thomson Financial).

Results do not indicate that investors respond

negatively to 10b5-1 disclosure or the disclosure of first trades executed within 10b5-1.
The lack of negative investor response to 10b5-1 disclosures may indicate that there are
frictions to implementing strategies based on 10b5-1 disclosure signals or that investors’ do
33

News event examples include exchange-imposed stock trade suspension, drug trial failure, and
announcement of the intent to acquire another firm.
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not understand 10b5-1 disclosure implications, which is possible if our sample period
reflects the transition period regarding 10b5-1 use. 34 It may also indicate that the reported
estimation method is misspecified or has low power.

4. Conclusions
This study examines implications of “scienter disclosure” through an analysis of
voluntary disclosures regarding insiders’ Rule 10b5-1 trading plans. In contrast to theory
that suggests there is no strategic advantage to disclosing an informed insider’s intent to
trade (Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996; Huddart, Hughes and Williams, 2004), evidence
suggests that disclosure related legal risk mitigation can compel firms to depart from a nondisclosure strategy.

Specifically, evidence indicates that participation disclosure is

increasing in firm litigation risk and in insiders’ strategic trade potential, suggesting that
firms and/or firm insiders infer legal benefits from disclosure. Evidence also indicates that
risk-mitigating disclosure may enhance insiders’ strategic trade profit potential.
Specifically, evidence indicates that disclosed 10b5-1 insiders’ sales transactions are
associated with fundamental firm economic shifts that relate to significant declines in
returns performance. Evidence also indicates that post-trade returns performance declines
are increasing in disclosure specificity. Collectively, this suggests that 10b5-1 disclosure
may provide legal protection for strategic trade, which is seemingly inconsistent with
regulatory intent.
Several governance implications may be drawn from these results. First, courts
might more carefully consider whether 10b5-1 disclosure mitigates scienter, since strategic

34

Anecdotally, some regulators, legal counselors, and institutional investors have noted that they have only
recently begun to understand the implications of Rule 10b5-1. Some have noted that their understanding has
improved with the increasing availability of historical data.
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trade patterns appear more in firms with enhanced disclosure.

Second, firms should

consider whether specific disclosure reduces or enhances insiders’ strategic trade options.
In some cases, it may reduce the value insiders’ options since it allows for ex post
revelation of early plan termination. However, it may enhance the value of other options,
such as planning trade in anticipation of longer-term negative news, since specific
disclosure may increase the likelihood of early legal case dismissal. Finally, the SEC
should consider that a mandate to disclose 10b5-1 participation might not mitigate strategic
trade within the Rule. If evidence in this study is reflective of Rule 10b5-1 use, then firms
that currently do not disclose participation (i.e., those most apt to be affected by a
disclosure mandate) are likely those that already have the lowest potential strategic trade.
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Figure 1
Example 10b5-1 Plan Disclosures
Panel A: Specific
Excerpts from PepsiAmericas Inc. Form 8-K, Filed March 3, 2005
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Figure 1 (continued)
Example 10b5-1 Plan Disclosures
Panel B: Limited
Excerpt from Ariba Inc. Form 8-K, Filed June 16, 2006

Excerpt from Build-A-Bear Workshop Inc. Form 8-K, Filed August 3, 2005
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Figure 2
Cumulative abnormal return relative to sales transactions
Panel A. Specific-disclosure sales
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Panel B. Limited-disclosure sales
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Panel C. Non-disclosure sales
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This figure plots the average cumulative abnormal return relative to insiders’ sales transactions within Rule
t
10b5-1. Each firm’s cumulative abnormal return is computed as CARt =
(R − R
) , where Rf is the

∑

d = −30

f

VWCRSP d

firm’s daily return,RVWCRSP is the daily return to the CRSP value weighted portfolio, and t denotes a specific
day relative to the transaction date. Trade-day observations = 1,108 specific, 23,040 limited, and 20,818 nondisclosure.
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Table 1
Disclosure of 10b5-1 plan participation determinants
Panel A: Summary statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

25%

50%

75%

LitRisk
InsideDirs
InstitOwn
Volat

0.014
0.363
0.497
0.029

0.017
0.167
0.272
0.017

0.006
0.242
0.263
0.017

0.009
0.353
0.521
0.024

0.015
0.460
0.727
0.036

Panel B. Statistics by disclosure type
Variable

None

Lim

Spc

Spc - None

Lim - None

Spc - Lim

Mean

Mean

Mean

Mean
(t-stat)

Mean
(t-stat)

Mean
(t-stat)

LitRisk

0.013

0.020

0.022

0.009
(4.37)

0.007
(12.00)

0.002
(0.85)

InsideDirs

0.366

0.354

0.372

0.006
(0.30)

−0.012
(−2.09)

0.018
(0.83)

InstitOwn

0.472

0.583

0.532

0.060
(1.62)

0.111
(11.80)

−0.051
(−1.40)

Volat

0.027

0.029

0.038

0.011
(4.98)

0.002
(4.09)

0.009
(3.86)
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Table 1 continued
Disclosure of 10b5-1 plan participation determinants
Panel C: Logistic regression
Full Sample

Matched Sample

Pr(Discl = 1)
Variable

Exp. Sign

Coeff.
(z-stat)

Coeff.
(z-stat)

LitRisk

+

10.009
(3.31)

10.471
(2.88)

InstitOwn

+

1.228
(5.63)

0.969
(3.94)

InsideDirs

−

−0.214
(−0.68)

−0.337
(−1.11)

Volat

+

22.189
(5.17)

25.143
(4.45)

Volat * InstitOwn

+

47.975
(4.33)

33.789
(2.42)

Volat * InsideDirs

+

31.625
(2.13)

29.043
(1.69)

Industry, Year
3,652
57
1,055
0.211

Match-pair
1,078
57
1,021
0.049

Fixed Effects
Num obs None
Num obs Spc
Num obs Lim
Pseudo R2

This table provides summary statistics (Panel A), univariate comparisons (Panel B), and logistic regressions
(Panel C) of the determinants of firms’ decisions to disclose participation in 10b5-1 plans. Comparisons are
made in the year of first disclosure for disclosing firms and in the first year of inferred 10b5-1 trade for nondisclosing firms. Panel C provides results from estimating: Pr (Discl = 1) =α0 + α1 LitRisk + α2 InstitOwn
+α3 InsideDirs + α4 Volat + α5 Volat * InstitOwn + α6 Volat * InsideDirs + +ε, where Discl is a
dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm discloses Rule 10b5-1 participation details, and zero
otherwise; LitRisk is the firm’s expected class action litigation probability estimated in the year prior to 10b51 participation disclosure; InstitOwn is the percentage of institutional firm ownership (CDA/Spectrum) in the
year prior to disclosure; InsideDirs is the ratio of officer directors to total board directors in the year prior to
disclosure (Equilar); and Volat is the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily firm returns on
daily value-weighted CRSP portfolio returns in the year prior to disclosure (CRSP). LitRisk is estimated from
the following annual cross-sectional logistic regression [similar to Rogers and Stocken (2005)]: Pr (DMGPd
= 1) = α0 + α1 MinReturn + α2 StdDevReturn + α3 Turnover + α4 MVE + α5 BHReturn + α6 Beta + α7
BiotechInd + α8 CompHWInd + α9 CompSWInd + α10 ElecInd + α11 RetailInd + ε, where DMGPd equals one
if the fiscal year falls within an alleged class action damage period (data provided by Woodruff Sawyer and
Co.) and equals zero otherwise; MinReturn is the minimum single day firm return during the fiscal year;
StdDevReturn is the standard deviation of daily returns during the fiscal year; Turnover is the average daily
trade volume scaled by shares outstanding during the fiscal year; MVE is the average market value of equity
during the fiscal year; BHReturn is the prior fiscal year’s buy and hold return; Beta is the firm’s beta
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coefficient from a regression of daily firm returns on daily market returns; and BiotechInd, CompHWInd,
CompSWInd, ElecInd, and RetailInd are dichotomous variables that equal one if the firm represents the
biotechnology, computer hardware, computer software, electric, or retail industries, and equal zero otherwise.
Column 1 of Panel C presents logistic regression results using all available observations and fixed industry
and year effects. Column 2 of Panel C presents conditional logistic regression results for the sample where
each disclosure firm is matched with a non-disclosure firm from the same year, same 2-digit industry, and
closest market value of equity.
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Table 2
Weighted average abnormal returns
Panel A. Insider specific statistics by disclosure type
Variable

None

Lim

Spc

Spc - None

Lim - None

Spc - Lim

Mean

Mean

Mean

Mean
(t-stat)

Mean
(t-stat)

Mean
(t-stat)

Cumulative Sales ($M)

6.589

8.206

5.618

−0.971
(−0.39)

1.617
(1.62)

−2.588
(−1.01)

Transaction Days

4.878

10.720

25.065

20.187
(3.59)

5.843
(16.54)

14.345
(5.84)

CEO

0.126

0.240

0.541

0.415
(6.43)

0.114
(13.57)

0.301
(5.44)

CFO

0.079

0.126

0.148

0.069
(1.50)

0.047
(7.13)

0.022
(0.47)

President

0.129

0.220

0.443

0.314
(4.88)

0.091
(10.89)

0.223
(4.15)

Director

0.559

0.471

0.820

0.261
(4.09)

−0.088
(−7.73)

0.349
(5.42)

Chairman

0.096

0.149

0.410

0.314
(4.93)

0.053
(7.26)

0.261
(5.62)

Officer

0.724

0.874

0.836

0.112
(1.95)

0.150
(16.21)

−0.038
(−0.89)

Num Insiders
Num Firms

5,362
1,833

3,049
1,199

61
49
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Table 2 (continued)
Panel B: Weighted Average Abnormal Returns
Horizon

Statistic

None

Lim

Spc

6-mo

Insiders
Firms

4,946
1,736

2,921
1,151

60
47

Mean
(t-statistic)

−0.003
(−1.00)

−0.056
(−13.56)

Median
(p-value)

−0.003
(0.027)

3-mo

1-mo

Lim – None

Spc – None

Spc - Lim

−0.123
(−2.91)

−0.053
(−9.72)

−0.120
(−2.82)

−0.067
(−4.53)

−0.050
(0.000)

−0.074
(0.002)

−0.047
(0.000)

−0.071
(0.001)

−0.024
(0.027)

5,186
1,794

2,982
1,177

60
47

Mean
(t-statistic)

−0.004
(−1.68)

−0.036
(−13.32)

−0.082
(−2.41)

−0.032
(−8.73)

−0.078
(−2.29)

−0.046
(−2.29)

Median
(p-value)

−0.003
(0.039)

−0.024
(−0.000)

−0.024
(0.030)

−0.021
(0.000)

−0.021
(0.020)

0.000
(0.154)

5,362
1,833

3,049
1,199

61
49

Mean
(t-statistic)

−0.006
(−5.11)

−0.014
(−10.94)

−0.058
(−3.32)

−0.008
(-4.18)

−0.052
(−2.95)

−0.044
(−2.26)

Median
(p-value)

−0.003
(0.000)

−0.008
(0.000)

−0.015
(0.005)

−0.005
(0.000)

−0.012
(0.011)

−0.007
(0.043)

Insiders
Firms

Insiders
Firms
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This table provides summary statistics (Panel A) and dollar volume-weighted average sales trade returns (Panel B) for insiders within specified disclosure
classification groups. Cumulative sales volume is the dollar volume of sales (in millions) during the one-year period that follows the first observed
disclosure between 2001 and 2006. Transaction days is the number of sales transaction days during the one-year period that follows the first observed
disclosure between 2001 and 2006. CEO, CFO, President, Director, Chairman, and Officer are dichotomous variables that equal one if the insider holds
where
the respective position title and equal zero otherwise. Weighted average abnormal returns are computed as J
DollarVol j

∑

j =1

∑

J
j =1

DollarVol

( BHRw − VWBHRw ) j ,

j

DollarVol is the trade dollar volume, BHRw is the trade’s w-month buy and hold return, VWBHRw is the w-month buy and hold return to the CRSP
value-weighted portfolio, and j is a subscript for each trade executed.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level (2-tailed), respectively. Significance for the medians is derived from the Kruskal-Wallis
test.
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Table 3
Calendar time portfolio returns
Rport – Rf
None

0.001
(0.46)
−0.010
(−2.25)

Limited

Specific

−0.002
(−0.26)
−0.012
(−1.86)

−0.047
(−2.94)

−0.043
(−5.27)

Rm -Rf

1.036
(21.33)

1.394
(9.53)

1.088
(2.13)

1.242
(9.42)

SMB

0.574
(10.70)

0.753
(4.93)

1.477
(3.12)

0.859
(6.21)

HML

0.195
(3.00)

0.027
(0.15)

0.387
(0.59)

0.225
(1.33)

UMD

0.172
(4.56)

0.025
(0.20)

−0.359
(−0.81)

0.022
(0.20)

Coefficient Comparisons
Limited – None

−0.010
(−1.86)

Specific – None

−0.041
(−4.08)

Specific – Limited

−0.031
(−3.04)

None Month-Obs
Limited Month-Obs
Specific Month-Obs
Adj R2

72
71
0.871

0.793

45
0.429

0.589

This table provides results from a regression of (Rport – Rf) = β0 + β1 (Rm – Rf) + β2 SMB + β3 HML
+ β4 UMD + u, where Rport is the equally-weighted monthly return to a portfolio of firms selected
if an insider initiates a sales transaction within Rule 10b5-1 in the preceding month, Rf is the onemonth treasury bill rate, Rm is the value-weighted monthly market return, and SMB, HML, and
UMD are the monthly small-minus-big, high-minus-low, and momentum factors discussed in
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). At least 3 firms must be present in each calendarmonth to form a portfolio.
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Table 4
Calendar time returns
Rj – Rm(ew)

Rj – Rm(vw)

None

−0.012
(−5.41)

−0.011
(−4.18)

Limited

−0.016
(−7.58)

−0.021
(−5.61)

Specific

−0.043
(−3.67)

−0.043
(−3.54)

Ln(BTM)

−0.021
(−12.08)

−0.021
(−9.82)

−0.003
(−2.60)

−0.004
(−2.32)

0.006
(0.14)

0.020
(0.45)

−0.019
(−2.38)

−0.011
(−1.70)

Limited – None

−0.004
(−1.35)

−0.010
(−2.97)

Specific – None

−0.031
(−2.63)

−0.032
(−2.70)

Specific – Limited

−0.027
(−2.34)

−0.022
(−1.81)

Fixed Effects
Std Error Clusters

Industry
Month

Industry
Month

0.013

1,840
1,200
46
0.012

PriorReturn
PriorVolatility
Intercept

Coefficient Comparisons

Number Firms None
Number Firms Limited
Number Firms Specific
Adj R2

This table provides results from a regression of (Rj– Rm) = δ0 + δ1 None + δ2 Limited + δ3 Specific + δ4
Ln(BTM) + δ5 PriorReturn + δ6 PriorVolatility + z, where Rj is the monthly firm return, Rm is the
equal-weighted or value-weighted monthly CRSP portfolio market return, None is a dichotomous
variable that equals one during the month following a non-disclosed inferred Rule 10b5-1 sales
transaction and equals zero otherwise, Limited is a dichotomous variable that equals one during the
month following a limited-disclosed Rule 10b5-1 sales transaction and equals zero otherwise,
Specific is a dichotomous variable that equals one during the month following a specific-disclosed
Rule 10b5-1 sales transaction and equals zero otherwise, BTM is the book-to-market ratio measured at
the end of the previous month, PriorReturn is the buy-and-hold firm return over the preceding 12
months, and PriorVolatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the preceding 36
months.
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Table 5
Investors’ response to earnings
Limited

Specific

Qtr Relative
to Disclosure

Mean
(t-stat)

Mean
(t-stat)

Qtr-4

0.008
(2.49)

0.030
(2.16)

Qtr-3

0.004
(1.48)

−0.007
(−0.29)

Qtr-2

0.008
(3.08)

0.034
(2.06)

Qtr-1

0.011
(4.30)

0.030
(2.16)

Qtr0

0.003
(0.92)

−0.002
(−0.12)

Qtr+1

−0.001
(−0.35)

−0.000
(−0.03)

Qtr+2

−0.000
(−0.06)

0.020
(1.18)

Qtr+3

−0.005
(−1.93)

−0.005
(−0.35)

Qtr+4

−0.006
(−2.10)

0.007
(0.63)

Qtr-4 to Qtr-1

0.008
(5.57)

0.024
(2.24)

Qtr+1 to Qtr+4

−0.003
(−2.23)

0.005
(0.75)

This table provides statistics regarding three day market-adjusted returns centered on quarterly earnings
announcement dates (RDQE from Compustat). Firm quarters are selected based on their proximity to the
quarter in which the first insider trade is executed following 10b5-1 disclosure (Qtr0). Firm returns over the
three days centered on the quarterly announcement are adjusted by subtracting the same period return to the
value-weighted CRSP portfolio. Sample reflects 902 limited and 33 disclosure firms with data for all
quarters.
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Table 6
Investors’ response to disclosure
Event
Announcement

Specific

Limited

Specific - Limited

Mean
(t-statistic)

−0.002
(−0.18)

−0.002
(−0.80)

0.000
(0.05)

Median
(p-value)

−0.003
(0.700)

−0.001
(0.221)

−0.002
(0.886)

63

559

Mean
(t-statistic)

−0.005
(−0.62)

0.003
(2.17)

−0.008
(−0.93)

Median
(p-value)

−0.011
(0.267)

0.001
(0.170)

−0.012
(0.119)

47

1,197

N
Transaction

N

This table provides statistics regarding three day market-adjusted returns centered on
Announcement, the Rule 10b5-1 disclosure event date, and on Transaction, the SEC report date for
the first sales transaction subsequent to Announcement. Announcement observations do not include
Form 4 disclosures, since the Form 4 disclosures are reflected as Transaction events. Returns
denoting market adjustments are adjusted by subtracting the same period return to the valueweighted CRSP portfolio.
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